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Abstract
We study economies in which agents face Knightian uncertainty
about state prices. Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlin-
ear expectations. We introduce a corresponding equilibrium concept
with sublinear prices and prove that equilibria exist under weak con-
ditions. In general, such equilibria lead to Pareto inefficient alloca-
tions; the equilibria coincide with Arrow–Debreu equilibria only if the
values of net trades are ambiguity–free in the mean. In economies
without aggregate uncertainty, inefficiencies are generic. We intro-
duce a constrained efficiency concept, uncertainty–neutral efficiency ;
equilibrium allocations under price uncertainty are efficient in this con-
strained sense. Arrow–Debreu equilibria turn out to be non–robust
with respect to the introduction of Knightian uncertainty.
1 Introduction
We study economies with Knightian uncertainty about state prices. Knight-
ian uncertainty describes the situation in which the probability distribution
of relevant outcomes is not known exactly. In such a situation, it is nat-
ural to work with a nonadditive notion of expectation derived from a set
of probability distributions. We introduce a corresponding nonlinear equi-
librium concept, Knight–Walras equilibrium, where the forward price of a
contingent consumption plan is given by the maximal expected value of the
net consumption value.
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In our economy, agents trade contingent plans on a forward market at
time 0 as in Debreu’s original model of trade under uncertainty. The market
is complete in the sense that all contingent plans are available. However,
Knightian uncertainty induces an imperfection in the price formation of the
market, resulting in sublinear prices.
Knightian uncertainty is described by a set of priors P which is common
knowledge; we think of it as imprecise, but objective probabilistic informa-
tion about the outcome distribution over Ω at time 1, as in Ellsberg’s thought
experiments. Following Walras and Debreu, we do not explicitly model the
price formation process, but rather model its outcome by a sublinear expec-
tation. The invisible hand of the market uses the maximal expected value
over the set of priors P to price contingent claims. One might think of a
cautious market maker who has imprecise probabilistic information about
the states of the world and computes the maximal expected present value
over a set of models to hedge Knightian uncertainty.
We establish existence of Knight–Walras equilibrium for general pref-
erences including the well studied classes of smooth ambiguity preferences
of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) and variational preferences of
Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006). The proof uses an adapta-
tion of Debreu’s game–theoretic approach which has an interesting economic
interpretation. Debreu works with a Walrasian auctioneer who maximizes
the expected value of aggregate excess demand. In our proof, we introduce
a further Knightian price player who chooses the relevant probability dis-
tribution. Under Knightian uncertainty, we can thus view Adam Smith’s
“invisible hand of the market” as consisting of two auctioneers where one
of them chooses the (state) price and the other one the relevant probability
distribution where “relevant” is to be understood as the prior under which
the expected value of net trades is maximal.
Given that we have a nonlinear price system, one might ask if agents
can generate arbitrage gains; any reasonable notion of equilibrium should
exclude such arbitrage, of course. In our context, there is no financial market,
so the arbitrage notion of a costless portfolio with positive gains does not
apply here. We consider two natural notions of arbitrage for our sublinear
prices. Following Aliprantis, Florenzano, and Tourky (2005), an arbitrage is
a positive consumption plan with zero price. We show that this is precluded
in Knight–Walras equilibrium. Alternatively, in our sublinear context, one
could think of making gains by splitting a consumption bundle into two or
more plans. Such arbitrage gains are neither possible; in fact, the convexity
of our price functional is the reason for the absence of such arbitrage.
In case of pure risk, i.e., when the set of probability distributions consists
of a singleton, the new notion coincides with the classic notion of an Arrow–
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Debreu equilibrium under risk. A main objective of our paper is to study
the differences that Knightian uncertainty of state prices create compared to
the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium concept. We show that Arrow–Debreu and
Knight–Walras equilibria coincide if and only if the values of the individual
net demands are ambiguity–free in mean, i.e., when there in no ambiguity
about the mean value of net demands.
We then ask how restrictive this condition is. To this end, we study
the well–known class of economies without aggregate uncertainty and
uncertainty–averse agents who share a common subjective belief at certainty.
This class of preferences is introduced in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008) and covers the well–studied class of pessimistic multiple prior agents
(Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), smooth ambiguity models (Klibanoff, Mari-
nacci, and Mukerji (2005)), and multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sar-
gent (2001)). Without aggregate uncertainty, Rigotti, Shannon, and Strza-
lecki (2008) show that an interior allocation is efficient if and only if each
agent is fully insured in equilibrium, extending previous results by Billot,
Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000) and Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon
(2000) for specific classes of preferences1. We show that generically in en-
dowments, these Arrow–Debreu equilibria are not Knight–Walras equilibria.
Intuitively, it will be rarely the case that agent’s net demand is ambiguity–free
in mean when individual endowments are subject to Knightian uncertainty.
Based on the generic non–equivalence of equilibria under Knightian price
uncertainty to Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, we show that Knight–Walras equi-
libria under no aggregate uncertainty are generically inefficient.
Efficiency is thus the exception under Knightian price uncertainty. We
introduce a notion of constrained efficiency which we call Uncertainty–Neutral
Efficiency. An allocation is constrained efficient if it is impossible to improve
the allocation by trading in an ambiguity–free way. The fictitious social
planner is thus restricted to redistributions with ambiguity–free net values.
We show that Knight–Walras equilibrium allocations are uncertainty–neutral
efficient.
We subsequently continue to explore the nature of Knight–Walras equi-
libria in economies without aggregate uncertainty. It turns out that Arrow–
Debreu equilibria are not robust with respect to the introduction of Knightian
uncertainty in prices. Even with a small amount of Knightian uncertainty,
1 De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) extend these results to the case of no aggregate
ambiguity, i.e.
∑
ei ∈ L. Strzalecki and Werner (2011) introduce the notion of a con-
ditional subjective beliefs to study efficient allocations in general. In particular, efficient
allocations are measurable with respect to aggregate endowment if agents share a common
conditional belief. A further discussion of efficient allocations on the interim stage can be
found in Kajii and Ui (2006) and Martins-da Rocha (2010).
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the unique Knight–Walras equilibrium has no trade, in sharp contrast to the
full insurance allocation of the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium. One might see
this result as an equilibrium extension of the seminal result of Dow and Wer-
lang (1992) who show that ambiguity–averse agents stay away from the asset
demand for a whole range of prices.
At the end of this introduction, we discuss nonlinearities in price systems
that have appeared in other economic environments. Our equilibrium and
efficiency results apply to these models in as far as the sublinear structure of
prices is shared.
While we favor the interpretation that the sublinearity of prices is a re-
sult of Knightian uncertainty, our model encompasses and generalizes various
other models of market imperfections that have been discussed in the liter-
ature. Sublinear prices arise in incomplete financial markets, in insurance
markets, or in markets with transaction costs. Our subsequent results apply
to those models as well, therefore.
Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) discuss sublinear functionals which
satisfy similar axioms as our Knightian expectation. They show that the
sublinear price functional is equal to the superhedging price of an exogenous
incomplete and arbitrage–free financial market if and only if mean–ambiguity
free and undominated claims coincide, where a claim is called undominated
if there is no superior consumption plan with the same price. Since we do not
impose such a condition, our setup is more general than the setup created
by incomplete financial markets. A further difference is the following. Since
Araujo et al. consider properties of superhedging prices in financial markets,
they work directly with the set of martingale measures while we rather work
with the set of probability measures which describe the Knightian uncertainty
of outcomes. In the case where our spot consumption price is simultaneously
a density for all priors, and the above condition on the equality of mean–
ambiguity free and undominated claims holds true, the results of Araujo et
al. would thus allow to construct an incomplete financial market with our
sublinear prices.
Jouini and Kallal (1995) discuss transaction cost models; they show that
financial markets with bid–ask spreads can be characterized by a set of mea-
sures under which the expected payoff of securities remains in the bid–ask
interval. This generalized class of martingale measures also leads naturally
to sublinear prices. It is an open question if one can construct for a given
sublinear price functional exogenous financial markets with transaction cost
that would lead to the same pricing functional. We conjecture that a similar
restriction as in Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) would need to be
satisfied as well.
Castagnoli, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2002) discuss sublinear prices in
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insurance markets. In particular, they characterize insurance prices which
can be written as the sum of a fair premium, i.e. the usual linear expected
net present value of the potential damage, and an ambiguity premium. Their
characterization thus shares a certain conceptual analogy to our above inter-
pretation of the sublinear price functional. Knightian uncertainty leads to
sublinear insurance prices. Our results below thus also shed some light on
(in)efficiency of insurance markets.
The papers cited above on incomplete markets, transaction costs, and in-
surance premia discuss properties related to sublinear functionals, but do not
study equilibrium. Our paper completes this gap in the literature. Nonlin-
ear forward prices are also discussed in Beißner (2012) and Cerreia-Vioglio,
Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2015). Aliprantis, Tourky, and Yannelis (2001)
consider nonlinear prices from an abstract point of view. More recently,
Richter and Rubinstein (2015) put forward an equilibrium notion based on
convex geometry for discrete commodities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the concept of Knight–Walras equilibria. Existence is established in the fol-
lowing section 3. Section 4 analyzes the relation to Arrow–Debreu equilibria.
Subsequently, we study efficient allocations under Knightian uncertainty and
discuss uncertainty–neutral efficiency. Section 6 investigates the sensitivity
of Arrow–Debreu equilibria with respect to Knightian uncertainty before we
conclude in Section 7. The Appendix collects proofs.
2 Knight–Walras Equilibrium
2.1 Expectations and Forward Prices
We consider a static economy under uncertainty with a finite state space Ω.
In risky environments, or for probabilistically sophisticated agents, expecta-
tions are given by probability measures on Ω; under Knightian uncertainty,
one is naturally led to sublinear expectations. Let us fix our notion of ex-
pectation first.
Let X = RΩ be the commodity space of contingent plans for our economy.
We call E : X → R a (Knightian) expectation if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. E preserves constants: E[m] = m for all m ∈ R,
2. E is monotone: E[x] ≤ E[y] for all x, y ∈ X with x ≤ y,
3. E is sub-additive: E[x+ y] ≤ E[x] + E[y] for all x, y ∈ X,
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4. E is homogeneous: E[λx] = λE[x] for λ > 0 and x ∈ X,
5. E is relevant: E[−x] < 0 for all x ∈ X+ \ {0}.
In the sequel, we denote by ∆ the set of all probability measures on Ω.
It is well known2 that E is uniquely characterized by a convex and compact
set P ⊂ ∆ of probability measures on Ω such that
E[x] = max
P∈P
EP [x] (1)
for all x ∈ X; EP denotes the usual linear expectation here. Relevance implies
that the representing set P in (1) consists of measures with full support in
the sense that for every P ∈ P we have P (ω) > 0 for every ω ∈ Ω.
The sublinear expectation E leads naturally to a concept of (forward)
price for contingent plans: let ψ : Ω → R+ be a positive state–price. The
forward price for a contingent plan x ∈ X is
Ψ(x) = E[ψx] ,
in analogy to the usual forward (or risk–adjusted) price under risk. We call
Ψ : X→ R coherent price system.
Remark 1 Incomplete nominal financial markets lead to sublinear price
functionals as discussed in Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012). In that
case, C can be identified with the sublinear expectation given by the set of
equivalent martingale measures of the financial market.
Our setup is more general as we start from a set of priors which describes
the Knightian uncertainty of the world. If we have EP [ψ] = 1 for all P ∈ P,
we can define a set of pricing measures
Q :=
{
Q ∈ ∆ : Q(ω) = ψ(ω)P (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω and some P ∈ P
}
. (2)
and
C(x) = max
Q∈Q
EQ[x]
is the cost functional of Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012). Under cer-
tain conditions on C, one can then construct a financial market which has
exactly this set of equivalent martingale measures.
2See Lemma 3.5 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Peng (2004), Artzner, Delbaen, Eber,
and Heath (1999), or Fo¨llmer and Schied (2011).
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2.2 The Economy with Sublinear Forward Prices
We introduce now an economy with sublinear forward prices. Uncertainty is
described by the state space Ω and the Knightian expectation E, respectively
the representing set of priors P. We discuss the role of E in detail below.
There is one physical commodity for consumption; an extension to finitely
many commodities is straightforward.
Definition 1 A Knightian economy (on Ω) is a triple
E = (I, (ei, Ui)i∈I ,E)
where I ≥ 1 denotes the number of agents, ei ∈ X+ =
{c ∈ X : c(ω) ≥ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω} is the endowment of agent i, Ui : X+ → R
agent i’s utility function, and E is a Knightian expectation.
As we fix the agents I = {1, . . . , I} throughout the paper, we will some-
times use the shorthand notation EP to emphasize the dependence of the
economy on the Knightian expectation E that is generated by P.
Definition 2 We call a pair (ψ, c) of a state–price ψ : Ω → R+ and an
allocation c = (ci)i=1,...,I ∈ XI+ a Knight–Walras equilibrium if
1. the allocation c is feasible, i.e.
∑I
i=1(ci − ei) ≤ 0,
2. for each agent i, ci is optimal in the Knight-Walras budget set
B(ψ, ei) = {c ∈ X+ : E[ψ(c− ei)] ≤ 0} , (3)
i.e. if Ui(d) > Ui(ci) then d /∈ B(ψ, ei).
We discuss some immediate properties of the new concept.
Example 1 1. When P = {P0} is a singleton, the budget constraint is
linear; in this case, Knight–Walras and Arrow–Debreu equilibria coin-
cide. In particular, equilibrium allocations are efficient.
Note that in expected utility economies, the probability measure P0 plays
a minor role in equilibrium. As Harrison and Kreps (1979) have
pointed out, the role of P0 consists of determining the null sets and
the commodity space of the economy. Indeed, the probability P0 and
the state price ψ determine a linear mapping x 7→ EP0 [ψx] for x ∈ X;
it is thus common in General Equilibrium Theory to look only at lin-
ear functionals Ψ of the form Ψ(x) =
∑
ω∈Ω q(ω)x(ω) for some q. As
long as P0 has full support, the two approaches are equivalent with
P0(ω)ψ(ω) = q(ω).
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2. At the other extreme, when P = ∆ consists of all probability measures,
and the state-price ψ is strictly positive, the budget sets consist of all
plans c with c ≤ ei in all states. We are economically in the situa-
tion where all spot markets at time 1 operate separately and there is
no possibility to transfer wealth over states. As a consequence, with
strictly monotone utility functions, no trade is an equilibrium for every
strictly positive state price ψ. Equilibrium allocations are inefficient,
in general, and equilibrium prices are indeterminate.
2.3 Discussion of Sublinear Prices
In our economy, agents trade contingent plans on a forward market at time
0 as in Debreu’s original model of trade under uncertainty. Note that the
market is complete in the sense that all contingent plans are available. How-
ever, Knightian uncertainty induces an imperfection in the price formation
of the market, resulting in sublinear prices.
The set of priors P is common knowledge of market participants; we think
of it as imprecise probabilistic information about the outcome distribution
over Ω at time 1, as in Ellsberg’s thought experiments. As in Walras and
Debreu’s models, we do not explicitly model the price formation process, but
rather model its outcome by the sublinear expectation E. The invisible hand
of the market uses the maximal expected value over a set of models to price
contingent claims. One might think of a cautious market maker who has
imprecise probabilistic information about the states of the world, described
by P. The market maker then computes the maximal expected present value
over this set of models to stay on the safe side. Such an approach is also
favored by recent approaches to the regulation of financial markets.
The price ψ(ω) is the spot price of the real consumption good in state
ω at time 1. For simplicity, we consider the case of one physical good, but
the extension to any finite number is straightforward; with d physical goods,
ψ(ω) and c(ω) would take values in Rd and ψ · c would be the scalar product.
The price ψ is used by the market to value contingent claims; the actual
trade is then carried out via the contracts made at time 0 and markets do
not re–open at time 1.
The Knight–Walras budget set B(ψ, ei) in (3) is the intersection of budget
sets under linear prices of the form EP [ψ·], that is,
B(ψ, ei) =
⋂
P∈P
BP (ψ, ei),
where BP (ψ, ei) =
{
c ∈ X+ : EP [ψ(c− ei)] ≤ 0
}
denotes the budget set in
an Arrow–Debreu economy under P = {P}. Hence, agents in the Knight-
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ian economy EP only consider those consumption bundles that are robustly
affordable against the price uncertainty P.
While we favor the interpretation that the sublinearity of prices is a re-
sult of Knightian uncertainty, our model encompasses and generalizes various
other models of market imperfections that have been discussed in the liter-
ature. Sublinear (forward) prices appear in incomplete financial markets, in
insurance markets, or in markets with transaction costs.
Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) discuss sublinear functionals which
satisfy similar axioms as our Knightian expectation. They show that the
sublinear price functional is equal to the superhedging price of an exogenous
incomplete and arbitrage–free financial market if and only if the subspace of
claims whose expectation does not depend on a specific prior P ∈ P coincides
with the subspace of undominated claims under E. In their setup, a claim
x is called undominated if there is no claim y > x with the same price. In
incomplete financial markets, exactly the hedgable claims are undominated;
claims that do not belong to the marketed subspace are dominated. In turn,
if one starts with a sublinear pricing functional, this latter condition is suffi-
cient to construct an incomplete financial market whose superhedging price
functional is equal to the given sublinear price functional. Since we do not
impose such a condition, our setup is more general than the setup created by
incomplete financial markets. Moreover, as Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro
(2012) consider the properties of superhedging prices in financial markets,
they work directly with the set of martingale measures, or set ψ = 1. In
the case where ψ is simultaneously a density for all P ∈ P, and the above
condition on the equality of mean–ambiguity free and undominated claims
are equal, the results of Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) would thus
allow to construct an incomplete financial market with our sublinear prices,
compare also Example 1.
Jouini and Kallal (1995) discuss transaction cost models; they show that
financial markets with bid–ask spreads can be characterized by a set of mea-
sures under which the expected payoff of securities remains in the bid–ask
interval. This generalized class of martingale measures thus leads naturally
to sublinear prices. It is an open question if one can construct for a given
sublinear price functional exogenous financial markets with transaction cost
that would lead to the same pricing functional. We conjecture that a similar
restriction as in Araujo, Chateauneuf, and Faro (2012) would need to be
satisfied as well.
Castagnoli, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2002) discuss sublinear prices in
insurance markets. In particular, they characterize insurance prices which
can be written as the sum of a fair premium, i.e. the usual linear ex-
pected value of the potential damage, and an ambiguity premium of the form
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AmbP(x) = supP,Q∈P
∣∣EP [x]− EQ[x]∣∣. Their characterization thus shares a
certain conceptual analogy to our above interpretation of the sublinear price
functional. Knightian uncertainty leads to sublinear insurance prices.
The papers cited above discuss properties related to sublinear functionals,
but do not study equilibrium. Our paper completes this gap in the literature.
2.4 On Utility Functions under Uncertainty
For our analysis, we will use two sets of assumptions on preferences and
endowments. First, we shall specify a very general set of properties inspired
by the classic assumptions made in General Equilibrium Theory.
Assumption 1 Each agent’s endowment ei is strictly positive. Each utility
function Ui : X+ → R is
• continuous,
• monotone, i.e. if c ≥ c′ then Ui(c) ≥ Ui(c′),
• semi–strictly quasi–concave, i.e. for all c, c′ ∈ X+ with U(c) > U(c′)
we have for all λ ∈ (0, 1)
U(λc+ (1− λ)c′) > U(c′) .
• and non–satiated, i.e. for c ∈ X+ there exists c′ ∈ X+ with Ui(c′) >
Ui(c).
Every concave utility function is semi–strictly quasi–concave. Semi–strict
quasi–concavity and non–satiation imply local non–satiation; for c ∈ X+ and
 > 0, non–satiation allows to choose c′ ∈ X+ with Ui(c′) > Ui(c). We can
find λ ∈ (0, 1) such that c′′ = λc + (1− λ)c′ satisfies ‖c− c′′‖ < ; by semi–
strict quasi–concavity, Ui(c
′′) > Ui(c). There are utility functions which
are monotone, semi–strictly quasi–concave, non–satiated, but not strictly
monotone. An example are multiple priors utilities as, in its simplest form,
Ui(x) = minω∈Ω x(ω). As far as existence is concerned, the assumption of
strict monotonicity of endowments can be weakened to a typical “cheaper
point assumption”. As our focus is on the effects of Knightian uncertainty,
we do not carry out this small generalization.
Preferences that allow for the perception of ambiguity have been exten-
sively explored in recent years. The following example lists some natural
utility functions in EP which have been axiomatized in the literature.
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Example 2 1. Multiple–prior expected utilities (Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989)) take the form
Ui(c) = −E[−ui(c)] = min
P∈P
EP [ui(c)] (4)
for a suitable (continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave)
Bernoulli utility function ui : R+ → R.
Subjective reactions to the imprecise probabilistic information P in the
spirit of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) can be described
by preferences of the form
Ui(c) = min
P∈Φi(P)
EP [ui(c)]
for a selection Φi(P) ⊂ P. Note that a singleton Φi(P) = {Pi} leads to
ambiguity–neutral subjective expected utility agents.
2. The smooth model of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) has
Ui(c) =
∫
P
φi
(
EP [ui(c)]
)
µi(dP )
for a continuous, monotone, strictly concave ambiguity index φi : R→
R and a second–order prior µi, a measure with support included in P.
3. Dana and Riedel (2013) introduce anchored preferences of the form
Ui(c) = min
P∈P
EP [ui(c)− u(ei)] .
These preferences have recently been axiomatized by Faro (2015). With
multiple prior utilities, they belong to the larger class of variational pref-
erences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006)) of the form
Ui(c) = inf
P∈P
EPui(c) + γ(P )
for a suitable penalty function γ : P→ R+ ∪ {∞}.
The above preferences share two common features which are typical for
ambiguity–averse preferences. We gather them in the following assumption.
In order to do so, the concept of subjective beliefs introduced by Rigotti,
Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) is useful. The set of subjective beliefs pii(c)
of agent i at c ∈ X+ is given by
pii(c) =
{
Q ∈ ∆ : EQ[y] ≥ EQ[c] for all y with Ui(y) ≥ Ui(c)
}
. (5)
The set pii(c) consists of the normalized supports of the upper contour sets
of Ui at the consumption plan c; it contains all beliefs for which the agent is
unwilling to trade net consumption plans with zero expected net payoff.
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Assumption 2 • The utility functions Ui are concave and strictly mono-
tone.
• Each Ui is translation invariant at certainty: For all h ∈ X and all
constant bundles c, c′ > 0, if Ui(c + λh) ≥ Ui(c) for some λ > 0, then
there exists λ′ > 0 such that Ui(c′ + λ′h) ≥ Ui(c′).
• Preferences are consistent with the set of priors P, i.e. we have pii ⊂ P,
and agents share some common subjective belief at certainty:
⋂I
i=1 pii 6=
∅.
Concavity is slightly more restrictive than semi–strict quasi–concavity,
but satisfied by most models. In the same spirit, strict monotonicity is a
slightly more restrictive condition than mere monotonicity, but will be sat-
isfied in most applications. Translation invariance at certainty is introduced
in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008). It ensures that subjective beliefs
are constant across constant bundles, and thus independent of the particular
constant c (Proposition 8 in their paper). We denote the subjective belief of
agent i at any constant bundle m > 0 by pii = pii(m).
Translation invariance at certainty is satisfied by the common utility func-
tions that model uncertainty aversion, including the ambiguity–neutral ex-
pected utility case, the smooth ambiguity model, multiple priors, and varia-
tional preferences that we listed above. The second part of the assumption
ensures that the subjective beliefs at constant bundles are consistent with
the set of priors P that describes the Knightian uncertainty of the economy.
As we assume that P is common knowledge, it is a natural assumption that
the subjective beliefs are consistent with the given imprecise probabilistic
information and that the agents share some belief about possible priors. Ac-
cording to Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008), efficient allocations under
no aggregate uncertainty are full insurance allocations if and only if agents
share some common subjective belief at certainty.
3 Existence of Knight–Walras Equilibria
In this section, we establish existence of a Knight–Walras equilibrium. If
agents have single–valued demand, one can modify a standard proof, as, e.g.
in Hildenbrand and Kirman (1988), to prove existence. Under Knightian
uncertainty, natural examples arise where demand can be set–valued. A
point in case are ambiguity–averse, yet risk neutral agents with Gilboa–
Schmeidler preferences. If we include this general case, one needs to work
more. We think that the proof, beyond the natural interest in generality,
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provides additional insights into the working of markets under Knightian
uncertainty as we explain below.
Theorem 1 Under Assumption 1, Knight-Walras equilibria (ψ, c) exist.
A standard existence proof of Arrow–Debreu equilibrium uses a game–
theoretic approach. One introduces a price player who maximizes the ex-
pected value of aggregate excess demand over state prices. Let us call this
type of player a Walrasian price player. The consumers maximize their util-
ity given the budget constraint. The equilibrium of the game is an Arrow–
Debreu equilibrium. Our method to prove existence follows this game–
theoretic approach. Due to Knightian uncertainty, we have to introduce
a second, Knightian, price player. This player maximizes the expected value
of aggregate excess demand over the priors P ∈ P, taking the state price as
given. The Walrasian price player in the Knight–Walras equilibrium acts in
the same way as in the Arrow–Debreu equilibrium.
Note that even though our market features sublinear prices, a weak form
of Walras’ law holds true. As semi–strict concavity and non–satiation imply
local non–satiation, the budget constraint is binding for each agent i at an
optimal consumption plan ci; by sublinearity, net aggregate demand ζ =∑I
i=1 ci − ei satisfies Ψ(ζ) ≤
∑I
i=1 Ψ(ci − ei) = 0.
Given that we have a nonlinear price system, one might ask if agents
can generate arbitrage gains; any reasonable notion of equilibrium should
exclude such arbitrage, of course. In our context, there is no financial market,
so the arbitrage notion of a costless portfolio with positive gains does not
apply here. We consider two natural notions of arbitrage for our sublinear
prices. Following Aliprantis, Florenzano, and Tourky (2005), an arbitrage is a
consumption plan c ∈ X+\{0} with Ψ(c) = 0. Alternatively, in our sublinear
context, one could think of making gains by splitting a consumption bundle
into two or more plans. Note that the gain from selling a plan c is the negative
of “buying” the plan −c, i.e. −Ψ(−c). The following proposition shows that
neither form of arbitrage is possible in Knight–Walras equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Let (ψ, (cˆi)i∈I) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium. Under As-
sumption 2, the following absence of arbitrage conditions hold true.
1. We have Ψ(c) > 0 for all c ∈ X+ \ {0}.
2. Let x = y+ z for x, y, z ∈ X. Buying (selling) x and selling (buying) y
and z separately yields no profits. We have
Ψ(x) ≥ −
(
Ψ(−y) + Ψ(−z)
)
and Ψ(y) + Ψ(z) ≥ −Ψ(−x).
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4 (Non–) Equivalence to Arrow–Debreu
Equilibrium
If the expectation E is linear, Knight–Walras equilibria are Arrow–Debreu
equilibria; by the first welfare theorem, equilibrium allocations are thus effi-
cient. With incomplete Knightian preferences in the sense of Bewley (2002),
the Arrow–Debreu equilibria of the linear economies E{P} are also equilibria
under Knightian uncertainty; see Rigotti and Shannon (2005) and Dana and
Riedel (2013). It seems thus natural to ask whether such a result might hold
true for our Knightian economies.
In a first step, we show that Knight–Walras equilibria are Arrow–Debreu
equilibria if and only if the expected net consumption values of all agents does
not depend on the specific prior in the representing set P int he sense of the
following definition. We then show for the particular transparent example
of no aggregate uncertainty that this property is generically not satisfied in
Knight–Walras equilibrium.
Definition 3 We call ξ ∈ X (P)–ambiguity free in mean if ξ has the same
expectation for all P ∈ P, i.e. there is a constant k ∈ R with EP [ξ] = k for
all P ∈ P. We denote the set of plans which are ambiguity–free in mean by
L or LP.
Note that ξ is ambiguity–free in mean if and only if we have
E[−ξ] = −E[ξ] .
We will use this fact sometimes below3.
We can now clarify when Arrow–Debreu equilibria of a particular linear
economy E{P} are also Knight–Walras equilibria.
Theorem 2 Fix a prior P ∈ P. Let (ψ, (ci)) be an Arrow–Debreu equilib-
rium for the (linear) economy E{P}. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium for EP.
2. The value of net demands ξi = ψ(ci − ei) are P–ambiguity free in the
mean for all agents i.
3 The concept has appeared before in De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) and Riedel
and Beißner (2014). For the notion of unambiguous events, see also Epstein and Zhang
(2001). A stronger notion would require that the probability distribution of a plan is the
same under all priors in P; Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) call such plans
“crisp acts”.
14
Let us consider the particularly transparent case of no aggregate un-
certainty. We shall show that generically in endowments, Arrow–Debreu
equilibria are not Knight–Walras equilibria.
Theorem 3 Assume that E is not linear. Under no aggregate uncertainty
and Assumption 1 and 2, generically in endowments, Arrow–Debreu equilib-
ria of E{P} for some P ∈ P are not Knight–Walras equilibria of EP.
More precisely: let M =
{
(ei)i=1,...,I ∈ XI++ :
∑
ei = 1
}
be the set of
economies without aggregate uncertainty normalized to 1. Let N be the subset
of elements (ei) of M for which there exists P ∈ P and an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium (ψ, (ci)) of the economy E{P} which is also a Knight–Walras equi-
librium of the economy EP. N is a Lebesgue null subset of the (I − 1) ·#Ω–
dimensional manifold M .
A key step in the proof of the above theorem is the insight of Lemma 1
below that the subspace of mean–ambiguity free contingent plans L has a
strictly smaller dimension that the full space RΩ if there is Knightian uncer-
tainty. Under our assumptions, Arrow–Debreu equilibrium allocations are
full insurance allocations; after changing the measure, the first order condi-
tions allow to identify the state price with the constant 1. Since L contains
the constant functions, one can show that an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium is
a Knight-Walras equilibrium only if the endowments are in L.
Lemma 1 1. The set L of plans ξ ∈ X which are P–ambiguity–free in
mean forms a subspace of X which includes all constant functions. If
#P > 1, L has a strictly smaller dimension than X.
2. For η ∈ X and ξ ∈ L we have E[η + ξ] = E[η] + E[ξ].
5 Efficiency
The previous section shows that Knight–Walras and Arrow–Debreu equilibria
rarely coincide under no aggregate uncertainty. The question thus arises if
the first welfare theorem holds true. To tackle this question, we discuss the
welfare properties of Knight–Walras equilibria in the light of recent results
on efficient allocations under Knightian uncertainty.
5.1 Pareto Efficiency and Knight–Walras Equilibria
Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki (2008) use the concept of subjective beliefs
that we introduced in Assumption 2 to characterize efficient allocations in
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the economy EP. They show that an interior allocation (c1, . . . , cI) ∈ (X++)I
is efficient if and only if the agents share a common subjective belief, i.e.
∩i∈I pii(ci) 6= ∅ with pii(ci) being the set of subjective beliefs of agent i at
consumption plan ci defined in (5).
Without aggregate uncertainty and when agents have multiple prior or
Choquet expected utility preferences, the above condition entails that an
interior allocation is efficient if and only if it fully insures each agent (Bil-
lot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000); Chateauneuf, Dana, and Tallon
(2000)). De Castro and Chateauneuf (2011) extend these results to the case
of no aggregate ambiguity in mean, i.e.
∑
ei ∈ L. Strzalecki and Werner
(2011) introduce the notion of a conditional subjective beliefs to study effi-
cient allocations in general. In particular, efficient allocations are measurable
with respect to aggregate endowment if agents share a common conditional
belief4.
In analogy to subjective beliefs, we now introduce the concept of effective
pricing measures ; for a coherent price system Ψ : X→ R we call
ϕΨ(ξ) =
{
Q ∈ ∆ : EQ[ξ] ≥ EQ[η] for all η with Ψ(η) ≤ Ψ(ξ)
}
the set of effective pricing measures at ξ ∈ X.
Proposition 2 For any ξ ∈ X, we have
ϕΨ(ξ) =
{
Q ∈ ∆ : Q = λψ · P for some λ > 0 and some P ∈ argmaxP ′∈PEP
′
[ψξ]
}
.
The concepts of subjective beliefs and effective pricing measures allow to
characterize Knight–Walras equilibria in a compact way.
Theorem 4 Let (ci) be a feasible interior allocation in EP. Under Assump-
tions 1 and 2, (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium for EP if and only
if
pii(ci) ∩ ϕΨ(ci − ei) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ I.
With the help of the previous theorem, we show that Knight–Walras
equilibria usually fail to be efficient when there is no aggregate uncertainty.
Theorem 5 Next to Assumptions 1 and 2, assume that the utility functions
Ui are differentiable at certainty. Under no aggregate uncertainty, generically
in endowments, Knight–Walras equilibrium allocations of EP are inefficient.
4A further discussion of efficient allocations on the interim stage can be found in Kajii
and Ui (2006) and Martins-da Rocha (2010).
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More precisely: let M =
{
(ei)i=1,...,I ∈ XI++ :
∑
ei = 1
}
be the set of
economies without aggregate uncertainty normalized to 1. Let Ne be the
subset of elements (ei) of M for which there exists a Knight–Walras equi-
librium (ψ, (ci)) such that (ci) is efficient. Ne is a Lebesgue null subset of the
(I − 1) ·#Ω–dimensional manifold M .
By the above theorem, Knight–Walras equilibria have inefficient alloca-
tions for large classes of economies. In particular, for the widely used classes
of smooth ambiguity preferences (Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005))
and of multiplier preferences (Hansen and Sargent (2001)), Knight–Walras
equilibria of economies without aggregate uncertainty are generically ineffi-
cient.
5.2 Uncertainty–Neutral Efficiency
In general, Knight–Walras equilibria are inefficient. We introduce now a con-
cept of constrained efficiency for our Knightian framework. If the Walrasian
auctioneer aims for robust rules, he might consider only values of net trades
that are independent of the specific priors in P.
We might also consider a situation of cooperative negotiation among the
agents. In a framework of Knightian uncertainty described by the set of
priors P, different priors may matter for different agents. For multiple prior
agents, e.g., different priors are usually relevant for buyers and sellers of a
contingent claim.
The preceding reasoning suggests the following concept of constrained
efficiency.
Definition 4 Let E = (I, (ei, Ui)i∈I ,E) be a Knightian economy. Let c =
(ci)i∈I be a feasible allocation. Let ψ be a state–price density. We call the
allocation c uncertainty neutral efficient (given ψ and P) if there is no other
feasible allocation d = (di)i∈I with
ηi = ψ (di − ei) ∈ LP
and Ui(di) > Ui(ci) for all i ∈ I.
Our notion of uncertainty–neutral efficiency shares some similarities with
other notions of constrained efficiency, but is slightly stronger. Suppose that
LQ is the marketed subspace of an incomplete financial market as in Remark
1. In this case, a feasible allocation c = (ci)i∈I is LQ–constrained efficient if
the net consumption bundle is in the marketed subspace, (ci−ei) ∈ LQ for all
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i ∈ I, and there is no other feasible allocation d = (di)i∈I with (di− ei) ∈ LQ
and Ui(di) > Ui(ci) for all i ∈ I, compare Magill and Quinzii (2002). We
do not impose the first condition that the net consumption plan be in LQ,
and thus uncertainty–neutral efficiency with respect to (ψ,P) is a stronger
condition than LQ–constrained efficiency.
Knight–Walras equilibria satisfy our robust version of efficiency.
Theorem 6 Let (ψ, c) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium of the Knightian
economy E = (I, (ei, Ui)i∈I ,E). Then c is uncertainty neutral efficient (given
ψ and E).
6 Sensitivity of Arrow–Debreu Equilibria
with respect to Knightian Price Uncer-
tainty
In this section we explore first the robustness of Arrow–Debreu equilibria with
respect to the introduction of a small amount of Knightian uncertainty when
agents have multiple–prior utilities. With no aggregate uncertainty, equilibria
change in a discontinuous way with small uncertainty perturbations; whereas
agents attain full insurance under pure risk, no trade (and thus no insurance)
occurs in equilibrium with a tiny amount of Knightian uncertainty. We then
take the opposite view and consider growing uncertainty. When uncertainty
is sufficiently large, no trade is again the unique equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we fix continuously differentiable, strictly con-
cave, and strictly increasing Bernoulli utility functions ui : R+ → R and
write for a given set of priors P
UPi (c) = min
P∈P
EP [ui(c)]
for the associated multiple–prior utility function. Let us start with an ex-
ample where the introduction of a tiny amount of uncertainty changes the
equilibrium allocation drastically.
Example 3 Let Ω = {1, 2}. Let the set of priors be P = {p ∈ ∆ : p1 ∈
[1
2
− , 1
2
+ ]} for some  ∈ [0, 1/2).
For  > 0, a consumption plan is ambiguity–free in mean if and only if it
is full insurance; we have LP = {c ∈ X : c(1) = c(2)}.
Let there be no aggregate ambiguity, without loss of generality e = 1 in
both states. Let there be two agents I = 2 (with multiple–prior utilities as
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stated above) and uncertain endowments, e.g. e1 = (1/3, 2/3) and e
2 =
(2/3, 1/3).
In a Knight–Walras equilibrium, the state price has to be strictly positive
because of strictly monotone utility functions UPi . Since we have two agents,
the budget constraint implies that
0 = E[ψ(c1 − e1)] = E[ψ(c2 − e2)]
or
0 = E[ψ(c1 − e1)] = E[(−ψ(c1 − e1))] .
Hence, ψ(c1− e1) is mean–ambiguity free, thus constantly equal to zero here.
Since ψ is strictly positive, c1 = e1 follows. There is no trade in Knight–
Walras equilibrium for every  > 0. In sharp contrast, agents achieve full
insurance in every Arrow–Debreu equilibrium of any linear economy E{P}.
Figure 1: An Edgeworth box for Example 3
The example and Figure 2 uses the fact that we are in a simple world with
two states and two agents. In general, the situation will be more involved.
Nevertheless, the discontinuity when passing from a risk economy to E{P} to
a Knightian economy EE remains.
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Let us now consider economies of the form
EE =
(
I,
(
ei, U
P
i
)
i=1...,I
,E
)
with strictly positive initial endowment allocation e = (e1, . . . , eI) ∈ XI++.
Here, E denotes the Knightian expectation induced by the set of priors P.
We assume that aggregate endowment is constant, e¯ =
∑
i∈I ei ∈ R++.
Let K(∆) be the set of closed and convex subsets of int(∆) equipped with
the usual Hausdorff metric dH . Define the Knight–Walras (KW) equilibrium
correspondence KW : K(∆)× XI+ ⇒ XI+1+ via
KW(P) =
{
(ψ, c) ∈ XI+1+ : (ψ, c) is a KW–equilibrium in EP
}
.
According to Theorem 1, the set of KW–equilibria KW(P) in the economy
is nonempty.
Theorem 7 Let P : [0, 1) → K(∆) be a continuous function with P(0) =
{P0} for some P0 ∈ int(∆). For 0 <  < 1, assume P0 ∈ intP() and
(ei) /∈ (LP())I .
The Knight–Walras equilibrium correspondence
 7→ KW(P(), e)
is discontinuous in zero.
For 0 ≤  < 1, define, as in Subsection 2.1, the Knightian expectation
E[X] = EP()[X] = maxP∈P() EP [X].
The previous result shows that a tiny amount of Knightian uncertainty
can substantially change equilibria. We now consider the opposite case of
growing Knightian uncertainty and impose no assumption on the aggregate
endowment e¯ =
∑
ei. We show that no trade is the only equilibrium if
Knightian uncertainty is large enough, thus generalizing our initial Example
1.2.
Next we state a simple result on uniqueness of Knight–Walras equilibria,
when no–trade is an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If (ψ, e) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium, then e is the unique
Knight–Walras equilibrium allocation.
Next we increase the Knightian uncertainty in the economy EP. As the
following result shows, if ambiguity becomes sufficiently large then there is
no trade in equilibrium. Recall that we keep the standing assumption on
multiple prior–utility functions.
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Theorem 8 If Knightian uncertainty is sufficiently large, every Knight–
Walras–equilibrium is a no–trade equilibrium: There is a P′ ∈ K(∆) such
that for every P′′ ∈ K(∆) with P′′ ⊃ P′ we have
KW(P′′) = XP′′ × {e}
for
XP′′ =
{
ψ ∈ X++
∣∣∣ ∃µ ∈ RI++ : ui′(ei) · argmin
P∈P′′
EP [ui(ei)] ∩ µiψ · P′′ 6= ∅, ∀i ∈ I
}
.
7 Conclusion
Knightian uncertainty leads naturally to nonlinear expectations derived from
a set of priors. This led us to study a new equilibrium concept, Knight–
Walras equilibrium, where prices are sublinear. We established existence
of such equilibrium points and studied its efficiency properties. While one
cannot expect fully efficient allocations, in general, the allocation of a Knight–
Walras equilibrium satisfies a restricted efficiency criterion: if the authority
is restricted to ambiguity–neutral trades, it cannot improve upon a Knight–
Walras equilibrium allocation.
The introduction of Knightian friction on the price side rather than the
utility side can have strong effects. In a world without aggregate uncertainty,
no–trade equilibria result even with a tiny amount of uncertainty. The abrupt
change of equilibria with respect to Knightian uncertainty has potentially
strong implications for consumption–based asset pricing results which rely
on the assumption of probabilistically sophisticated agents and markets. In
dynamic and continuous–time models, these questions remain to be explored.
A Existence
The proof of Theorem 1 follows Debreu’s game–theoretic approach. We will
prove existence first in the compactified or truncated economy in order to
ensure a compact valued demand correspondence. The budget set B(ψ, ei),
defined in (3), is in general not compact within X, so we truncate B by intro-
ducing B(ψ, ei) = B(ψ, ei)∩[0, 2e¯], where e¯ =
∑
i ei denotes the aggregate en-
dowment and [0, 2e¯] denotes the compact order interval {x ∈ X : 0 ≤ x ≤ 2e¯}.
The corresponding truncated economy EP is given by
E =
(
I,
(
ei, U i
)
i∈I ,E
)
,
21
where U i : [0, 2e¯] → R is the restriction of Ui to the truncated consumption
set [0, 2e¯].
To prepare the proof of the existence of Knight–Walras equilibria, we
begin with an investigation of the truncated Knight-Walras budget corre-
spondence B. To prove the continuity of our budget correspondence, we
follow the lines of Debreu (1982). We let
∆ =
{
ψ ∈ X+ :
∑
ω∈Ω
ψ(ω) = 1
}
.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, we have the following properties for the
budget sets in the truncated economy.
1. The budget sets B(ψ, ei) are nonempty, compact, and convex for all
ψ ∈ ∆.
2. The correspondence ψ 7→ B(ψ, ei) is homogeneous of degree zero.
3. The correspondence ψ 7→ B(ψ, ei) is continuous at any ψ ∈ ∆.
Proof of Lemma 3:
1. Since 0, ei ∈ B(ψ, ei) and 0, ei ∈ [0, 2e¯], for every ψ, ei ∈ X+, the trun-
cated budget set B is nonempty. The untruncated budget set B(ψ, ei)
is the intersection of budget sets under linear prices of the form EP [ψ·],
that is,
B(ψ, ei) =
⋂
P∈P
BP (ψ, ei),
where BP (ψ, ei) =
{
c ∈ X+ : EP [ψ(c− ei)] ≤ 0
}
denotes the closed and
convex budget in an Arrow–Debreu economy under P = {P}. The
arbitrary intersection of convex (closed) sets is again convex (closed)
and so is B(ψ, ei). Consequently, B(ψ, ei) is nonempty, compact and
convex.
2. By definition, the Knightian expectation E is positively homogeneous.
The result then follows by the same arguments as in the case with linear
price systems.
3. The order interval [0, 2e¯] is a compact, convex, nonempty set in X = RΩ.
We prove the continuity of B : ∆⇒ [0, 2e¯].
To establish upper hemi-continuity, it suffices to show the closed graph
property, since B is compact valued by part 1. The graph of the budget
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correspondence gr(B) = {(ψ, x) ∈ ∆ × [0, 2e¯] : x ∈ B(ψ, x)} is closed
since ψ 7→ maxP∈PEP [ψx] is continuous for all x ∈ X, by an applica-
tion of Berge’s maximum theorem.
Now let us consider lower hemi-continuity. Let ψn → ψ and x ∈
B(ψ, ei). Let us denote by Ψn the price system induced by a normalized
ψn ∈ ∆. We consider two cases.
Case 1: If Ψ(x− ei) < 0, then by continuity, for some n¯ ∈ N, we have
Ψn(x− ei) < 0 for n ≥ n¯. We define the following converging sequence
xn =
{
x′n ∈ B(ψn, ei) arbitrary, if n ≤ n¯
x, n > n¯.
Then xn → x and xn ∈ B(ψn, ei).
Case 2: We now consider the case Ψ(x−ei) = 0. Note that Ψ(x′−ei) <
0 for x′ = ei
2
: since E is relevant and endowments are strictly positive
by assumption 1, we get
Ψ(x′ − ei) = 1
2
Ψ(−ei) = 1
2
E(−ψei) < 0.
For n large,
Ψ∩n = {y ∈ X : Ψn(y− ei) = 0}∩ {y ∈ X : ∃λ ∈ R : y = λx+ (1− λ)x′}
is nonempty. Since Ψ∩n is the closed subset of a line, x¯n =
arg miny∈Ψ∩n ‖y − x‖ is unique. Now, set
xn =
{
x¯n, if x¯n ∈ [x′, x]
x, else.
By construction, we have xn ∈ B(ψn, ei) and xn → x in X.
2
Proof of Theorem 1:
We show first existence of an equilibrium in the truncated economy E =(
I,
(
ei, U i
)
i∈I ,E
)
and verify later that this candidate is also an equilibrium
in the original economy EP.
The existence proof of an equilibrium in E is divided into six steps.
1. Continuity of the Budget correspondence: By Assumption 1, each initial
endowment ei is strictly positive. The continuity of the correspondence
B : ∆⇒ [0, 2e¯] follows from Lemma 3.3.
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2. Properties of the demand correspondence: Consider the (truncated)
demand correspondence X i : ∆ ⇒ [0, 2e¯]. By step 1, B(·, ei) : ∆ ⇒
[0, 2e¯] is continuous, hence by Berge’s maximum theorem the demand
X i(ψ) = arg max
x∈B(ψ,ei)
U i (x)
is upper hemi-continuous, compact and non–empty valued, since U i is
continuous on gr(B). By quasi–concavity of Ui, X i(ψ) is convex-valued.
3. Walrasian Auctioneer: Define the Walrasian price adjustment corre-
spondence W : [0, 2e¯]I × P⇒ ∆ via
W (x1, . . . , xI , P ) = arg max
ψ∈∆
EP
[
ψ
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei
)]
.
As W consists of the maximizers of a linear functional over a compact
set, the correspondence is upper hemi-continuous by Berge’s Maximum
Theorem, and it attains convex, compact and nonempty values.
4. Knightian Auctioneer: Define the Knightian adjustment correspon-
dence K : [0, 2e¯]I ×∆⇒ P via
K (x1, . . . , xI , ψ) = arg max
P∈P
EP
[
ψ
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ei
)]
.
Once again, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem, the correspondence is up-
per hemi-continuous. Since EP is linear and P is convex, K is convex–,
compact– and nonempty–valued.
5. Existence of a Fixed-Point: Set X =
(
X1, . . . , XI
)
. Putting things
together we have the combined correspondence[
KXW
]
: P× [0, 2e¯]I ×∆⇒ P× [0, 2e¯]I ×∆
as a product of nonempty–, compact–, and convex –valued upper hemi-
continuous correspondences (see step 2, 3 and 4). Consequently, a
fixed–point (
P¯ , x¯1, . . . x¯I , ψ¯
) ∈ [KXW ] (P¯ , x¯1, . . . x¯I , ψ¯)
exists by an application of Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem.
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6. Feasibility: We check the feasibility of the fixed-point allocation x¯.
By the budget constraint, the sublinearity of c 7→ E[ψ¯c] (since ψ¯ ≥ 0),
we get for the fixed point
(
P¯ , x¯1, . . . x¯I , ψ¯
)
0 ≥
∑
i
E
[
ψ¯(x¯i − ei)
]
≥ E
[
ψ¯
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
= EP¯
[
ψ¯
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
≥ EP¯
[
ψ
∑
i
(x¯i − ei)
]
. (6)
The first inequality follows from the definition of the budget set and
x¯i ∈ X i(ψ) for all i ∈ I. The last inequality holds for all ψ ∈ ∆ and
by the positive homogeneity of linear expectations, it holds even for all
ψ ∈ X+. We thus have l
(∑
i∈I x¯i − ei)
) ≤ 0 for all positive linear forms
on X. This implies
∑
i∈I(x¯i − ei) ≤ 0.
For the feasibility of the equilibrium allocation, the truncation is irrel-
evant.
7. Maximality in EP: Since x¯i ∈ X i(ψ¯), we have
x¯i ∈ argmaxx∈B(ψ,ei)∩[0,2e¯] U¯i(x).
We have to show that x¯i also maximizes Ui on B(ψ, ei). Suppose there is
a x ∈ B(ψ, ei) in the original budget set, such that Ui(x) > Ui(x¯i). Then
we have for some λ ∈ (0, 1), λx+(1−λ)x¯i ∈ B(ψ, ei) = B(ψ, ei)∩[0, 2e¯].
The semi–strict quasi–concavity of Ui yields Ui(λx+(1−λ)x¯i) > Ui(x¯i),
a contradiction. Therefore, (x¯1, . . . , x¯I , ψ¯) is also an equilibrium in the
original economy EP.
2
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. Suppose that for some c ∈ X+\{0} we have Ψ(c) ≤ 0. Then sublinearity
of Ψ and the equilibrium budget constraint imply that c˜ = cˆ1+c satisfies
Ψ(c˜ − e1) ≤ Ψ(c) + Ψ(cˆ1 − e1) ≤ 0. Hence, c˜ is in the budget set of
agent 1; by strict monotonicity, U1(c˜) > U1(cˆ1), a contradiction to the
equilibrium conditions.
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2. For x, y, z ∈ X, assume that x = y + z holds true. Buying the asset x
at cost Ψ(x) and selling y and z separately yields no profits. Let Pz
minimize EP [ψz] over P. Then
−
(
Ψ(−y) + Ψ(−z)
)
= min
P∈P
EP [ψy] + min
P∈P
EP [ψz]
≤ EPz [ψy] + EPz [ψz]
= EPz [ψx]
≤ max
P∈P
EP [ψx] = Ψ(x).
Similarly, selling the asset x short and buying y and z separately yields
no profits because of the sublinearity of Ψ. Let Px minimize E
P [ψz]
over P. Then
Ψ(y) + Ψ(z) = max
P∈P
EP [ψy] + max
P∈P
EP [ψz]
≥ EPx [ψy] + EPx [ψz]
= EPx [ψx]
= min
P∈P
EP [ψx] = −Ψ(−x).
2
Proof of Theorem 2: Let (ψ, (ci)) be an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium for
the (linear) economy E{P}. Then markets clear.
Suppose first that the value of net demands ξi = ψ(ci−ei) are ambiguity–
free in the mean for all agents i. We need to check that ci is in agent i’s
budget set for the Knightian economy EP, and optimal. By assumption, we
have
EQ[ψ(ci − ei)] = k
for all Q ∈ P for some constant k. As ci is budget–feasible in EP and utility
functions are locally non–satiated by Assumption 1, we have k = 0, i.e.
E[ψ(ci − ei)] = EP [ψ(ci − ei)] = 0 .
As ci is part of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium, ci is optimal in the linear
budget set given by the prior P ; this budget set contains the budget of
the Knightian economy EP, defined in (3). Hence, ci is optimal for agent i
in the Knightian economy. We conclude that (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras
equilibrium for EP.
Now suppose that (ψ, (ci)) is a Knight–Walras equilibrium. We need to
check that all ξi have expectation zero under all P ∈ P for all i.
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As utility functions are locally non–satiated, the budget constraint is
binding for all agents, E[ξi] = 0 for all i. It is enough to show that E[− ξi] =
0 for all i (because this entails minP∈PEP [ξi] = maxP∈PEP [ξi] = 0 .) By
sublinearity, we have E[− ξi] ≥ 0. Market clearing implies
E[−ξi] = E
[∑
j 6=i
ξj
]
≤
∑
j 6=i
E[ξj] = 0 .
We conclude that E[−ξi] = 0 for all i, as desired. 2
Proof of Theorem 3: Let (ei) be an allocation in N . Let (ψ, (ci)) be an
Arrow–Debreu equilibrium of the economy
(
I, (ei, Ui)i∈I , {P}
)
which is also
a Knight–Walras equilibrium of EP.
Due to our assumptions, Proposition 9 in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strzalecki
(2008) yields that (ci) is a full insurance allocation. Utility maximization in
Arrow–Debreu equilibrium implies that for some λi > 0 we have λiψ ·P ∈ pii
for all i; in particular, there exists Q ∈ ⋂Ii=1 pii ⊂ P such that λiΨ(ci − ei) =
EQ[ci − ei]. Therefore, the allocation (ci) and the price ψ˜ = 1 form an
Arrow–Debreu equilibrium in the economy
(
I, (ei, Ui)i∈I , {Q}
)
.
From Theorem 2, we then know that (ci − ei) ∈ L. As ci is constant,
it belongs to L; as L is a vector space by Lemma 1, we conclude ei =
−(ci − ei) + ci ∈ L. As the vector space L has strictly smaller dimension
than X, again by Lemma 1, we conclude that N is a null set in M . 2
Proof of Lemma 1:
1. Let L denote the set of all contingent plans which are ambiguity–free in
mean. Constant plans are obviously ambiguity–free in mean, hence L is
not empty. As expectations are linear, the property of being ambiguity–
free in mean is preserved by taking sums and scalar products. Hence,
L is a subspace of X.
If #P > 1, we have P1, P2 ∈ P such that P1 − P2 6= 0 ∈ X. In abuse of
notation x ∈ X is {P1, P2}–ambiguity–free in the mean, if
〈P1, x〉 = 〈P2, x〉.
This equation yields a hyperplane H = {x ∈ X : 〈P1 − P2, x〉 = 0},
with 0 ∈ H. Consequently H is subvector space of X with strictly
smaller dimension and contains all plans being {P1, P2}–ambiguity free
in mean.
The result follow from the first part and {P1, P2} ⊂ P implies L ⊂ H.
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2. As ξ is ambiguity–free in mean, we have EP [ξ] = E[ξ] for all P ∈ P.
As E is additive with respect to constants, we obtain
E[X] + E[ξ] = max
P∈P
EP [X] + E[ξ] = max
P∈P
(
EP [X] + E[ξ]
)
= max
P∈P
(
EP [X] + EP [ξ]
)
= max
P∈P
EP [X + ξ] = E[X + ξ] .
2
Proof of Proposition 2: From Proposition 2 of Rigotti, Shannon,
and Strzalecki (2008), we have that a risk–neutral multiple–prior expected
utility (see Example 2) with state dependent utility index u(ω, c) = ψ(ω)u(c),
satisfies
piMEU(c) =
{
q
‖q‖ : q = ψP for some P ∈ arg minP∈P E
P [ψc]
}
.
Using min(·) = −max(−·) and the definition of ϕΨ, the result follows. 2
Proof of Theorem 4:
The condition
pii(ci) ∩ ϕΨ(ci − ei) 6= ∅
is the necessary and sufficient first–order condition for the utility maximiza-
tion problem of agent i in our non–differentiable setup. Let us denote the
sub-differential of a convex function f at by x ∈ X by ∂f(x) = {Df(x) ∈
X : f(y) − f(x) ≥ Df(x)(y − x) ∀y ∈ y ∈ X}. Clearly −Ui and Ψ are
convex. Optimality of ci for agent i
′s problem is then characterized by
0 ∈ ∂ − Ui(ci) + ∂µiΨ(ci − ei), for some µi ≥ 0, for all i ∈ I . This yields
∂ − Ui(ci) ∩ µi∂Ψ(ci − ei) 6= ∅. The assumption of an interior allocation
makes each consumption ci not binding to the positivity constraint ci ∈ X+.
Hence, µi > 0 and the result follows after an appropriate normalization, since
subjective beliefs pii and subjective pricing measures ϕ are collinear with the
respective to the sub-differentials ∂ − Ui and ∂Ψ.
2
Proof of Theorem 5: Let (ψ, c) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium and
assume that (ci) is efficient.
Due to our assumptions and Proposition 9 in Rigotti, Shannon, and Strza-
lecki (2008), (ci) is a full insurance allocation. As the utility functions are
differentiable at certainty, the subjective belief pii is a singleton; as the agents
share a common subjective belief, we have pii = {Q} for some Q ∈ P. By
Proposition 2, Q ∈ ϕΨ(ci − ei); in particular,
EQ[ci − ei] = 0
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for all i = 1, . . . , I. We conclude that ψ˜ = 1 and (ci) form an Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium in the economy E{Q} because (ci) is feasible and satisfies the
(necessary and sufficient) first–order condition of utility maximization under
the Arrow–Debreu budget constraint. Theorem 3 concludes the proof. 2
Proof of Theorem 6: Let (ψ, c) be a Knight–Walras equilibrium of the
Knightian economy E = (I, (ei, Ui)i∈I ,P). Suppose there is a feasible alloca-
tion d = (di)i=1,...,I with Ui(di) > Ui(ci) for all i ∈ I. From optimality, we have
then di /∈ B(ψ, ei), or E[ηi] > 0. Suppose furthermore ηi = ψ (di − ei) ∈ LE.
Take any prior P ∈ P. As the net excess demand is ambiguity–free in mean,
we have
EP [ηi] = E[ηi] > 0 .
As the expectation under P is linear, we obtain by summing up and feasibility
of the allocation d
0 = EP
[
I∑
i=1
ψ(di − ei)
]
=
I∑
i=1
EP [ψ(di − ei)] > 0 ,
a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 7: For  = 0, we are in an Arrow–Debreu economy
without aggregate uncertainty. As a consequence, KW(P(0), e) contains only
full insurance allocations.
Fix  > 0. Let us first show that a mapping X : Ω → R is P()–
ambiguity–free in mean if and only if it is constant. Due to our assumptions,
P() contains a ball (relatively to ∆) around P0 of the form
Bη(P0) = {Q ∈ ∆ : ‖Q− P0‖ < η}
for some η > 0. We use here, without loss of generality, the maximum norm
in RΩ.
Suppose EQ[X] = k for some k ∈ R and all Q ∈ P(). Let 1 =
(1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ X denote the vector with all components equal to 1. Let
Z ∈ X satisfy Z · 1 = 0 with ‖Z‖ = 1. Then P0 + η˜Z ∈ Bη(P0) ⊂ P() for all
0 < η˜ < η. Hence, we have
c = EP0+ηZ [X] = EP0 [X + η˜Z ·X] .
As 0 < η˜ < η is arbitrary, Z · X = 0 for all Z with norm 1 and Z · 1 = 0
follows. By linearity, this extends to all Z with Z · 1 = 0; it follows that X
is a multiple of 1, hence constant.
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In the next step, we show that (ψ, c) ∈ KW(P()) implies c = e. Let (ψ, c)
be a Knight–Walras equilibrium for the economy EP(). Let ξi = ψ(ci − ei)
be the value of net trade for agent i. Then we have
∑
i∈I ξi = 0 by market
clearing in equilibrium. As the utility functions are strictly monotone, the
budget constraint is binding, so E[ξi] = 0 for all i. From subadditivity, we
get E[−ξi] ≥ 0. On the other hand, from market clearing, subadditivity,
and the binding budget constraint,
E [−ξi] = E
[∑
j 6=i
ξj
]
≤
∑
j 6=i
E[ξj] = 0 .
We conclude that ξi is ambiguity–free in mean, thus constant. Due to the
budget constraint, ξi = 0. As state prices must be strictly positive in equi-
librium due to strictly monotone utility functions, we conclude that ci = ei.
The Knight–Walras equilibrium correspondence is thus discontinuous in
zero. 2
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose there is another Knight–Walras equilibrium
allocation (ψ′, x) with ∅ 6= J = {i ∈ I : xi 6= ei}. We have UPj (xj) ≥ UPj (ej)
for all j ∈ J.
We show E[ψ′(xj − ej)] > 0 for all j ∈ J, which contradicts the budget
feasibility of xj. Take some  > 0 and note that U
P
j (xj + ej) > U
P
j (xj) by
strict monotonicity. As xj is optimal in the budget set, we obtain E[ψ′(xj +
ej − ej)] > 0. Letting  to zero, we have E[ψ′(xj − ej)] ≥ 0. Now suppose
E[ψ′(xk − ek)] = 0 for some k ∈ J. Under the assumptions for this section,
UPk is strictly concave, we derive for any µ ∈ (0, 1)
UPk (µxk + (1− µ)ek) > µUPk (xk) + (1− µ)UPk (ek) ≥ UPk (ek).
We now obtain, by the positive homgeneity of E
0 < E [ψ′ (µxk + (1− µ)ei − ek)]
= E [ψ′µ(xk − ek)]
= µE [ψ′(xk − ek)]
≤ 0 ,
a contradiction. 2
Proof of Theorem 8: Since utility is strictly increasing, an equilibrium
state price must be strictly positive.
Under full Knightian uncertainty, P = ∆, the budget set of agent i is
[0, ei]. By strict monotonicity and convexity of preferences, the better–off set
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{x ∈ X+ : UPi (x) ≥ UPi (ei)} can be supported by a hyperplane with a strictly
positive normal vector pii. Since U
P
i is of multiple–prior type, an increase of
P to P′ ∈ K(∆) let the better–off set {x ∈ X+ : UP′i (x) ≥ UP′i (ei)} shrink and
P pii = pii‖pii‖ ∈ ∆ remains a supporting prior.
For large P′ such that P pii ∈ P′ for all i ∈ I, all individual first–order con-
ditions are satisfied. ei is then optimal in BP
′
(1, ei). A larger P′′ ⊃ P′ leaves
this result unchanged. An application of Lemma 2 establishes uniqueness of
the no–trade equilibrium. 2
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